Bias v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 45037 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-2-2018 
Bias v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45037 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Bias v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45037" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 7121. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7121 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
WILLIAM JACK BIAS, )
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) NO. 45037
)
v. ) MADISON COUNTY NO. CV 2015-543
)







APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MADISON
________________________
HONORABLE GREGORY W. MOELLER
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
I.S.B. #6555 Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
REED P. ANDERSON Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender (208) 334-4534
I.S.B. #9307










TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................ 13
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 14
I. The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It
 Considered The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing
 To Challenge The Reasonable Suspicion For The Stop After The
 Prosecution Presented Evidence That Was Never Disclosed To
 Mr. Bias, And Failed To Further Object To The District Court’s
 Consideration Of The Issue But Instead Chose To Call
 Additional Witnesses To Testify On The Issue .................................................. 14
A. Introduction  ............................................................................................. 14
B. Standard Of Review ..................................................................................... 14
C. The District Court Provided The State Ample Notice Of The Claim
   That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Motion
   To Suppress Challenging The Reasonable Suspicion For The
   Traffic Stop  ............................................................................................. 16
D. The Issue Of Whether Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File
A Motion To Suppress Challenging The Reasonable Suspicion For The
Traffic Stop Was Tried With The Implicit Consent Of The Prosecution ....... 21
II. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards When It Held
 That Mr. Bias’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective .................................................. 22
A. Introduction  ............................................................................................. 22
B. Standard Of Review ..................................................................................... 22
C. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards ............................. 22
ii
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 30




Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ..................................................................................... 11
Cady v. Pitts, 102 Idaho 86 (1981) ............................................................................................ 16
Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702 (Ct. App. 1986) ......................................................................... 16
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323 (1986) .................................................................................. 16, 19
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50 (2005) .................................................................................passim
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430 (1986) .......................................................................................... 15
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139 (Ct. App. 2015) ...................................................................... 23
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ......................................................................................... 23
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231 (Ct. App. 1994) ....................................................................... 15
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) .......................................................................... 11
M. K. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345 (1980) ................................................................. 21
Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495 (2000) ......................................................... 19
O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904 (2008) .......................................................... 16
Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533 (1977) ..................................................................................... 17
Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494 (1996) .................................................................................... 21
Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758 (Ct. App. 2006) ........................................................................... 23
Rauh v. Oliver, 10 Idaho 3 (1904) ............................................................................................. 16
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991) ......................................................................... 29
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1998) ....................................................................... 29
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999) ........................................................................ 23, 26, 27
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015)....................................................................................... 4, 28
Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718 (1987) ......................................................................................... 15
iv
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..................................................................... 2, 23
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416 (2004) ...................................................... 16
Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713 (2017) ............................................................................... 23
Rules
I.R.C.P. 8(e) .............................................................................................................................. 17
I.R.C.P. 15(b) ...................................................................................................................... 19, 21
----
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court granted Mr. Bias’s petition for post-conviction relief and ordered that
his guilty plea be withdrawn after finding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress.  The State appeals from the district court’s order and asserts that the district
court erred by ruling on an allegedly unpled claim and applying an incorrect ineffective
assistance of counsel standard.  The State’s arguments ignore the unique and disturbing facts of
this case, ignore the hearings that demonstrate the prosecution received ample notice of the
relevant  claim,  and  ignore  the  district  court’s  meticulous  and  careful  analysis.   Indeed,  a
thorough review of all the facts, the district court’s application of the law to those facts, and the
district court’s commitment to justice and fairness at every juncture of this case, shows the
district court did not err.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After consulting with his trial counsel, Mr. Bias pleaded guilty to felony driving under
the influence.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.30, L.23 – p.32, L.16; R., p.48.)  What Mr. Bias did not know
when he made that decision was that his attorney never filed a request for discovery in his case
and was therefore unaware that an exculpatory video of his traffic stop existed.  Indeed, in this
post-conviction  case,  the  district  court  held  that  the  video  showed  the  officer  did  not  have
reasonable suspicion for the stop and thus would have supported a successful suppression
motion.  (R., pp.58-63, 67-70.)  Such a motion to suppress, however, was never filed.  Instead,
Mr. Bias pleaded guilty, and the district court imposed a ten-year sentence, with five years fixed.
(R., p.48.)
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After  he  was  sentenced,  Mr.  Bias  filed  a  petition  for  post-conviction  relief  in  which  he
made multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  (R., pp.4-7.)  One of those claims
alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the “protocol of the stop and
jurisdiction of law enforcement” and refusing “to file a motion to suppress for jurisdiction.”1
(R., p.6 (spelling corrected.).)  After finding that Mr. Bias alleged facts that gave rise to the
possibility of some valid claims, the district court granted his request for court-appointed
counsel.  (R., pp.13-16.)
The first evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction claims was held on July 25, 2016.
(R., pp.29-30.)  At that hearing, Mr. Bias said that he had asked his trial counsel to file a motion
to suppress “two or three times,” but his attorney assured him that it was a “legitimate stop and
basically refused to put in the motion to suppress . . . .”  (7/25/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.4-12.)  The district
court said that it had to determine whether there were meritorious grounds for a motion to
suppress on the jurisdictional issue.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.69, Ls.14-25.)  The district court stated it
would, in the interest of “fairness” and “thoroughness,” give Mr. Bias’s post-conviction counsel
ten days to file a memorandum on the issue, and it was “particularly interested in seeing a
prejudice analysis under Strickland2 as far as the claims of the unfiled motion to suppress.”
(7/25/16 Tr., p.70, L.16 – p.71, L.1.)  It also said it would allow the State seven days to respond
to the memorandum.  (7/25/16 Tr., p.71, Ls.8-9.)
After Mr. Bias’s counsel filed the memorandum, the parties stipulated to reopening the
evidence, and the district court held a second evidentiary hearing on September 19, 2016.
1 Mr. Bias “initially based his claim for ineffectiveness on his trial counsel’s failure to file a
motion to suppress on the basis that the arresting officer was acting outside of his jurisdictional
boundaries.”  (R., p.60.)
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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(R., pp.31-39.)  At the beginning of that hearing, the prosecutor confirmed that he wanted to put
on evidence limited to the jurisdictional issue, and post-conviction counsel agreed that it was not
planning on addressing other issues.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.74, L.20 – p.75, L.17.)  The prosecutor then
called the police officer who originally stopped Mr. Bias, Corporal Robison.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.75,
L.22 – p.76, L.25.)  He testified as to where he stopped Mr. Bias and revealed that there was a
video of the stop.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.77, L.8 – p.79, L.19.)  He confirmed that the video was from
his dashboard camera, and the video was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.80, L.20
– p.81, L.12.)
After watching the video, however, Mr. Bias’s counsel said neither he nor Mr. Bias had
ever seen the video before, and that the video raised “a whole new set of issues whether the
officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to even pull the vehicle over, based upon
what we see in that video.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.135, L.24 – p.136, L.6.)  He encouraged the district
court, in light of this new evidence the prosecution had introduced, to examine whether a motion
to suppress should have been filed to challenge the reasonable suspicion for the stop.  (9/19/16
Tr., p.136, Ls.8-14.)  The district court said, “[I]t seems like the further we dig into this, the legal
issues keep growing, like, exponentially; so I’m trying to get my head around the issues I have to
rule on.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.15-18.)  The court then asked if Mr. Bias’s counsel was
“asserting a new basis for post-conviction relief on failure to suppress the evidence for lack of
reasonable suspicion to pull over the vehicle,” and counsel responded, “Well, I think we have to,
based on what we saw today in this video, Your Honor.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.19-24.)
Counsel  then  reiterated  that  this  was  the  first  time he  or  his  client  had  seen  the  video,  and  the
video raised the issue of whether a motion to suppress should have been filed to challenge the
reasonable suspicion for the stop.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, L.25 – p.137, L.11.)
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After watching the video, post-conviction counsel acknowledged that the jurisdictional
issue was likely resolved by introduction of the video; he said that he and Mr. Bias thought the
traffic stop had occurred farther north than the video showed because they had only seen the
police report.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.137, L.12 – p.138, L.3.)  He argued, however, that the video did
show that there was not enough evidence to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop because
the video tended to disprove the police report.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.139, Ls.4-23.)  For example, the
police report indicated that Mr. Bias was driving under the speed limit, “braked hard when
approaching a curve in the road,” drove on the fog line, and drifted in his lane of travel.  (State’s
Exhibit 14.)  But the video showed that Mr. Bias actually only tapped his brakes, did not swerve
in his lane, and may not have even touched the fog line.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.140, L.5 – p.141, L.24.)
When the district court asked the prosecutor if it wanted to respond to this “new area,”
the prosecutor said, “Well, as I understand it, Your Honor, we keep delving into new areas.  As I
understand the last hearing we had, this was raised as a side issue after it was all over.”  (9/19/16
Tr., p.142, Ls.4-10.)  The district court agreed but said, “Well, let’s assume we’re all in this
business because we’re trying to get it right.  So help me get it right.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.142, Ls.11-
20.)  The prosecutor said, “Well, and I think we have got it right.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.142, Ls.21-
22.)  He then argued that there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and the stop was made
within the jurisdiction of the officer.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.142, L.22 – p.144, L.3.)  The district court
asked if either party wished to brief the new issue, but the parties did not submit briefing.
(9/19/16 Tr., p.144, L.16 – p.145, L.2.)
At the subsequent status hearing on November 28, 2016, the district court said it was
working on its decision and had come across a case—State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015).
(11/28/16 Tr., p.146, L.19 – p.147, L.12.)  The court recognized that Neal held touching the fog
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line does not provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.147, Ls.13-21.)  It
also said it had looked at the video again and saw there was a car driving in front of Mr. Bias that
was going the same speed, so it appeared Mr. Bias, “could have been driving with the flow of
traffic.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.148, Ls.16-21.)  It also stated that, while Mr. Bias’s car may have
moved in its lane, any “weaving” was “virtually undetectable,” and the brakes were only
“tapped, not slammed on.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.148, Ls.22-25.)
The district court then acknowledged that, at the beginning of the previous hearing, the
parties were only arguing the jurisdictional issue.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.4-11.)  It explained,
“And yet, at the very end of the hearing, we go into this new issue, which, if the Court considers,
could be dispositive of the whole case.  And so here’s the quandary the Court is under.  First of
all . . . I don’t think the State had adequate time to respond either in briefing or with additional
evidence . . . to the issue about the reasonable suspicion for the stop, especially in light of Neal.”
(11/28/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.11-20.)  As such, the district court said it would give the prosecution an
opportunity, if it so desired, to submit briefing “on whether the Court should even consider this
evidence, since there was an agreement that I wouldn’t.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.21-24.)  And it
went on to explain that although it was essentially finished with its opinion, its “sense of justice”
found that  “it  wouldn’t  be  fair  to  the  State  to  proceed  further  without  giving  them a  chance  to
address these concerns” that it raised because it had “never had a chance to respond . . . .”
(11/28/16 Tr., p.150, Ls.12-17.)  It said if the prosecution wanted the court to simply make its
decision at that point, it would, but “if the State would like to present more, I think you have a
right to, in fairness.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.150, Ls.20-25.)
The prosecution said it would “appreciate some more time.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.2-
3.)  The district court asked the prosecution if it would like to respond to the new issue, and how
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much time it would need to do so; it also said the prosecution could respond in briefing or bring
in other evidence or witnesses if it chose to.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.13-20.)  And it then stated,
“I think in fairness you should be allowed to do that, because you weren’t given proper notice
that this issue was going to be raised.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.20-22.)  It also said, “And, of
course, I also want you to brief whether or not I should even consider this issue procedurally.”
(11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.23-25.)
The prosecutor asked for 45 days to submit briefing and said Corporal Robison would
testify again.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.153, Ls.1-13.)  He also said that he would need Mr. Bias’s trial
counsel to testify because, while he was “sure we gave him discovery,” he would need to find
out whether he shared that discovery with Mr. Bias.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.155, Ls.6-10.)  The district
court said, “I just want to get this right the first time; so we’ll give everybody an opportunity to
brief that issue further.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.156, Ls.14-16.)
The prosecutor did not submit briefing, but instead chose to call more witnesses at the
third evidentiary hearing, held on January 12, 2017.  First, he called Mr. Bias’s trial counsel who
testified  that,  based  on  what  he  saw  in  the  police  report,  he  did  not  believe  that  there  was  a
potentially successful suppression issue.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.25, L.16 – p.26, L.2.)  On cross-
examination, however, he said that he did not review the video of the stop with Mr. Bias because
he “did not ask for the video.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.6.)  He said, “If Mr. Bias would
have said, ‘This is baloney, the stop.  Let’s challenge this,’ then yeah, I would have—at a prelim
I would have asked for videos.  I would have handled the case completely differently than the
way I did.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-11.)
Mr. Bias’s post-conviction counsel then asked if there had been times in trial counsel’s
practice when a video did not “match up” with a police report, and trial counsel confirmed this.
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(1/12/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.21-25.)  When asked if “this could have been a case where review of the
police report may have been different than what the actual video” showed, trial counsel said he
sometimes requested videos, and there had been times when the video did not match the police
report.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.1-22.)  Trial counsel also said that if Mr. Bias had said he wanted
to contest the stop, he would have asked for a copy of the video, and this was his typical practice.
(1/12/17 Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.5.)  He confirmed that his strategy was focused on sentencing,
and he wanted to try to show the district court that Mr. Bias had made improvements in his life
and should thus qualify for Drug Court.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.34, L.25 – p.35, L.5.)  However, when
post-conviction counsel asked whether reviewing the video to see what happened in the stop
could have given him “ammunition to help weaken the State’s case,” to get to that eventual result
of  probation  and  Drug Court,”  he  said,  “Yeah.   If  he  would  have  at  any  time said,  ‘Man,  let’s
fight this,’ then that’s exactly what I would have done.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.35, Ls.6-13.)
The district court then asked whether trial counsel knew that a video of the stop existed,
and counsel responded, “No. I don’t recall ever asking the prosecutor.  I don’t recall.”  (1/12/17
Tr., p.36, Ls.3-6.)  He agreed that if the prosecution did not disclose that a video existed, this
would be grounds to challenge the conviction, and he said that the first time he became aware
that the video existed was “[d]uring this post-conviction case.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.36, Ls.7-20.)  He
also  agreed  that  it  would  “typically  behoove  a  defense  attorney  to  review  a  video”  before
allowing a client to plead guilty.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.7-11.)  Similarly, when the district court
asked whether constitutional problems with the stop could have “been a basis” for trial counsel
to use in his “negotiations with the prosecutor to try to get a lower charge made or considerations
in a sentencing recommendation,” trial counsel also answered, “Yes.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-
6.)  Finally, the court asked, “In your experience have you been able to negotiate better plea
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agreements with a prosecutor because there’s been some apparent constitutional issue with the
stop?”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.38, Ls.18-21.)  And trial counsel again answered, “Yeah, yes.”  (1/12/17
Tr., p.38, L.22.)
Post-conviction counsel then asked if trial counsel filed a formal request for discovery in
this case, and trial counsel replied, “I looked at the court file, I did not.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.7-
9.)  Post-conviction counsel asked, “And so your request for discovery in this case was just an
informal request to the prosecutor’s office of police reports?”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.10-12.)
Counsel replied, “Yeah.  When I get assigned to a case, I wander over to the prosecutor’s office
and ask for copies, and they produce them.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.13-15.)  Post-conviction
counsel asked if it was trial counsel’s practice to “just have kind of an informal relationship with
the prosecutor’s office and not request formal discovery in cases” such as Mr. Bias’s.  (1/12/17
Tr., p.40, Ls.16-19.)  Trial counsel responded, “When there’s going to be a fight, and I know
there’s going to be, then yes, I file a formal discovery.  But otherwise, they have an open-door
policy with me, and I’ve never had a problem with them hiding stuff from me.”  (1/12/17
Tr., p.40, Ls.20-24.)
The prosecution then called Corporal Robison to testify again.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.43, L.2 –
p.63, L.8.)  It also called two other officers to testify about what they saw in the video.3  (1/12/17
Tr., p.64, L.3 – p.112, L.8.)  At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, the district court said to
the prosecutor, “Let’s hear your argument then.  Or if you are planning to brief this further, we
can just let you submit it on your briefs.  How would you like to proceed?”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.113,
Ls.3-12.)  The prosecutor asked for an extension beyond the 45 days it had been given for
3 As the State is not challenging on appeal the district court’s holding that—if Mr. Bias had been
able to file a motion to suppress—the motion would have been granted because Corporal
Robison lacked reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, detail regarding the officers’
testimony is not relevant to the issues before this Court.
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briefing, but post-conviction counsel objected, so the district court agreed to hear the
prosecutor’s argument and decide whether any further briefing would be necessary.  (1/12/17
Tr., p.113, L.13 – p.114, L.9.)
The prosecutor argued that the district court had to consider the state of the law at the
time trial counsel made the decision not to file the motion to suppress and largely quoted from
Strickland regarding judging the reasonableness of an attorney’s actions.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.114,
L.20 - p.117, L.14.)  He argued that trial counsel relied on Mr. Bias’s statements to him, and his
review of the police report, and this led to his strategy regarding sentencing.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.117,
L.15 – p.118, L.20.)  But the district court said, while it did not “want to get into the business of
second-guessing defense counsel’s strategy . . . it’s not the defendant with the legal training; it’s
the attorney with the legal training.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.119, Ls.13-24.)  The district court went on
to ask how an attorney could make a decision on what to do “without seeing the video or
inquiring further, to know whether or not there’s even a basis to challenge any of the issues . . . .”
(1/12/17 Tr., p.119, L.24 – p.120, L.3.)  It then opined, “In other words, to say, ‘Well, Mr. Bias
told me he didn’t think there was any problem,’ that means the attorney with the law degree is
relying upon the defendant without the law degree to make a legal conclusion.  And I’m not sure
Strickland necessarily quite supports that kind of way of practicing law.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.120,
Ls.3-9.)  Finally, the prosecutor argued that there was no prejudice and cited to several cases to
support its argument that there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.123,
L.20 – p.126, L.18.)
Post-conviction counsel then pointed out that he thought it was “imperative” for attorneys
to get as much information as possible because “a client’s decision is really only based upon the
information the client’s provided.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.127, Ls.1-20.)  He said that his contract states
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that he has a “responsibility, whether or not the client likes it, to go through and request formal
discovery and then review it with my client.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.130, Ls.2-13.)  He then argued that
the video did prove prejudice because the video did not match the police report.  (1/12/17
Tr., p.131, L.24 – p.133, L.19.)
At  the  end  of  the  hearing,  the  district  court  said  again  that  it  was  close  to  issuing  a
decision at the end of the prior hearing, but because these “newer issues had just developed at the
very end of our last hearing, without the State having had an opportunity to really—I felt like the
State was a little bit unintentionally or accidentally ambushed, because I don’t think the plaintiff
was intending to raise that issue until he actually saw the video.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.138, Ls.11-20.)
It went on to explain, “I think everybody, including the State, is entitled to their day in court.
And I feel like everyone’s had that now.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.138, Ls.23-25.)  Post-conviction
counsel asked about briefing on the issue, and the district court said, “At this point I think I’m
going to take the matter under advisement.  So I don’t think any additional briefing—I think you
two have argued it and presented evidence effectively.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.139, Ls.4-10.)
The district court granted post-conviction relief after finding that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress challenging the reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop.  (R., pp.58-64, 71-72.)  In its order, the district court noted that the State initially
objected when the discovery of the video prompted post-conviction counsel to expand the
motion to suppress issue.  (R., pp.59-60.)  However, the district court found that Mr. Bias “did
set forth a claim” that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge both the jurisdiction
and the protocol of the stop.  (R., p.60.)  Thus, the district court held that “the legality of the stop
had been previously raised by Bias, at least generally, long before the second evidentiary
hearing.”  (R., p.60.)
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Notably, the district court also thoroughly addressed two issues, which had “not been
properly pled or raised prior to the three evidentiary hearings,” but “caused the Court serious
concerns.”   (R.,  pp.67-71.)   It  wrote  that  it  was  “alarmed  to  learn  of:   (1)  the  failure  of  trial
counsel to request discovery before having his client plead guilty, and (2) the State’s apparent
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), due to its failure to disclose obvious
exculpatory evidence; i.e. the dashcam video.”  (R., p.67.)  With respect to the first issue, it ruled
that failure to request the video was prejudicial because it “would have strengthened Bias’s
case.”  (R., p.68.)  Additionally, it noted that the United States Supreme Court had addressed the
same issue and held that similar behavior places “at risk both the defendant’s right to an ‘ample
opportunity to meet the case of prosecution’ and the reliability of the adversarial testing
process.”  (R., pp.68-69 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986)).)  It
explained that even if it were to accept trial counsel’s “explanation that he does not typically
investigate further or file a motion to suppress when his client expresses a desire to get help, this
does not excuse the fact that defense counsel is effectively depriving his client of the ability to
make a knowing and intelligent decision to plead guilty . . . .”  (R., p.69.)  The district court also
wrote that if Mr. Bias had been able to properly assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for the failure to formally request discovery, “it may have justified a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel . . . .”  (R., p.69.)
In  its  conclusion,  the  district  court  explained  its  decision  in  more  detail.   It  stated  that
while most of Mr. Bias’s claims lacked merit, it was “left with an abiding conviction that Bias—
facing a ten year prison sentence—should have been permitted an opportunity to challenge the
legality of his stop and view the dashcam video before deciding to plead guilty.”  (R., p.71.)  It
went on to write, “If, after reviewing the video and having the opportunity to discuss with his
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attorney  the  weaknesses  in  the  State’s  case  it  reveals,  he  had  still  wished  to  plead  guilty,  that
would have been a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive his right to challenge
the  State’s  evidence  and  plead  guilty.”   (R.,  p.71.)   It  wrote  that  despite  “the  weakness  in  the
evidence supporting reasonable suspicion for a stop as contained in the police report, Bias pled
guilty anyway.”  (R., p.71.)  And it stated,  “[t]he failure to challenge the stop on the basis of the
tenuous grounds alleged in the police reports alone fell short of the objective standard of
reasonableness set forth by Strickland, and was a primary reason why the dashcam video was not
discovered sooner.  Therefore, the first Strickland prong has been met.”  (R., p.71.)
In regard to the prejudice prong, the district court wrote, “By so holding, the Court does
not wish to second-guess a strategic decision made by an experienced defense attorney.
However, this case clearly illustrates the pitfalls of having a defendant plead guilty without
conducting thorough investigation and discovery.”  (R., p.72 (internal citation omitted).)  It went
on to state, “If a motion to challenge the legality of the stop had been properly brought, the Court
concludes  that  it  would  have  granted  such  a  motion  under  the  totality  of  the  circusmtances.”
(R.,  p.72.)   Finally,  the  district  court  wrote,  “The  Court  must  further  conclude  that  but  for
counsel’s failure to request discovery and challenge the constitutionality of the stop, Bias would
not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.  Therefore, Bias has shown that he
was prejudiced by his attorney’s actions, and the second prong of Strickland is  also  met.”
(R., p.72 (internal citation omitted).)  The district court entered a judgment granting the petition,
and the State filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment.  (R., pp.76-80.)
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ISSUES
The State phrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err by considering the unpled claim that counsel should have
challenged the reasonable suspicion for the stop?
2. Did the district court err when it applied an incorrect legal standard to the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a suppression motion?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
Mr. Bias rephrases the issues as:
1. Has the State failed to show that the district court erred when it considered the
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the reasonable
suspicion for the stop after the prosecution presented evidence that was never
disclosed to Mr. Bias, and failed to further object to the district court’s
consideration of the issue but instead chose to call additional witnesses to testify
on the issue?
2. Did the district court apply the correct legal standards when it held that Mr. Bias’s




The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Considered The Claim
That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The Reasonable Suspicion For The
Stop After The Prosecution Presented Evidence That Was Never Disclosed To Mr. Bias, And
Failed To Further Object To The District Court’s Consideration Of The Issue But Instead Chose
To Call Additional Witnesses To Testify On The Issue
A. Introduction
At  the  second  evidentiary  hearing  on  Mr.  Bias’s  post-conviction  claim  that  his  trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress on the grounds that the officer
who stopped him was outside his jurisdiction, Mr. Bias discovered for the very first time that the
State  actually  had  a  video  of  the  traffic  stop.   The  video  showed that  the  officer  did  not  have
reasonable suspicion for the stop, which supported a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion to suppress on those grounds.  Mr. Bias, therefore, immediately upon
learning of the existence of the video, moved to amend the pleadings to make an additional
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The State argues that because Mr. Bias did not make his
claim before learning of the video’s existence—and therefore of the claim’s existence—the
district court should not have considered the claim.
But  the  district  court  appreciated  that  it  was  fundamentally  unfair  for  Mr.  Bias  to  have
entered a guilty plea without seeing all the evidence in his case.  And the district court found that
his plea could not be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary without having ever seen the video of
his  traffic  stop.   Mr.  Bias  did  not  know  about  this  evidence  either  because  the  State  failed  to
provide it or because his trial counsel failed to request discovery.  Regardless, the district court
was gravely concerned about both Mr. Bias’s decision to plead guilty without having had the
opportunity to see the video, and the reasons he did not get that opportunity.  Indeed, the district
court included an additional four pages in its order discussing the reasons Mr. Bias was never
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made aware of the video and trying to provide guidance for defense attorneys and prosecutors, so
that a situation like this did not happen again.
In its attempt to argue that the district court erred, the State fails to discuss these facts or
acknowledge  their  gravity.   Thus,  its  arguments  skirt  the  real  problem in  this  case.   The  State
argues that it was the prosecution that did not receive notice of the issue before the court because
the district court considered an allegedly unpled claim.  This is a specious argument for several
reasons.  First, the State ignores what occurred after the video was introduced by the prosecution.
Indeed, the State’s argument on this issue focuses on what happened at the second evidentiary
hearing where the video was introduced, and the events prior to that hearing.  The subsequent
hearings, however, clearly show that the district court did not rule on the claim at the second
evidentiary hearing but instead provided ample notice and an opportunity for the prosecution to
respond to the issue raised by the newly revealed video.  Thus, the district court’s consideration
of the issue was not prejudicial to the prosecution.  Second, despite the prosecution’s initial
objection to the new issue, the subsequent hearings show that the issue was tried with the implied
consent of the prosecution.  And finally, even if the claim was technically “unpled,” as the State
argues, it was “unpled” precisely because the video was not disclosed until the prosecution
introduced it to disprove the jurisdictional claim; it is impossible to make a claim and allege facts
based on evidence you do not know exists.
B.  Standard Of Review
Where the district court grants post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, this
Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.” Howard v.
State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 720
(1987); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 434 (1986)).  “Findings supported by competent and
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substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be disturbed on appeal.” Id. (citations
omitted).  The “Court exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law
to the facts.” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2005).
C. The District Court Provided The State Ample Notice Of The Claim That Trial Counsel
Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Motion To Suppress Challenging The Reasonable
Suspicion For The Traffic Stop
Focusing this Court’s attention on the second evidentiary hearing in this case, where the
video was first revealed, the State makes a notice argument about Mr. Bias’s initial pleading.
(App. Br., pp.6-12.)  Specifically, the State argues that the prosecution did not receive adequate
notice  of  the  claim  that  Mr.  Bias’s  trial  counsel  was  ineffective  by  failing  to  challenge  the
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, suggesting the inadequacy of that notice was unjust.
(App. Br., pp.11-12.)
However, the “technical rules of pleading have long been abandoned in this state.”
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325 (1986) (citing Rauh v. Oliver, 10 Idaho 3, 9 (1904)).  “It is
clear that a trial court may and is required to grant any relief to a party which the evidence
demonstrates a party is entitled to, whether or not such has been specifically requested.” Cady v.
Pitts, 102 Idaho 86, 90 (1981); accord O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 911
(2008); Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1986) (“We also agree that the judge had
the authority—even the duty—to grant the relief to which [plaintiffs] were shown to be entitled
although they had not demanded such in their pleadings.”).  “The general policy behind the
current rules of civil procedure is to provide every litigant with his or her day in court.” Clark,
110 Idaho at 325 (citation omitted).  “The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is
whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it.” Vendelin v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427 (2004) (citation omitted).  Further, “Pleadings must be
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construed  so  as  to  do  justice.”   I.R.C.P.  8(e).   Finally,  trial  courts  have “wide discretion in
permitting amendments of pleadings to conform to the proof.” Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho
533, 537 (1977) (citations omitted).
  Here, the State’s notice argument focuses almost exclusively on what occurred “through
the second evidentiary hearing.”  (App. Br., pp.8-12.)  For example, the State argues that the fact
the  “prosecutor  was  surprised  when  the  theory  was  first  presented  .  .  .  .”  is  important.   (App.
Br., p.11.)  But this fails to acknowledge that the entire complexion of the case changed at the
second hearing when the prosecutor introduced the video.  Indeed, Mr. Bias was also quite
surprised at that point.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.1-6.)
Because everyone was surprised, the court was careful to give the State ample
opportunities to meet the new claim and evidence.  At the November status hearing, the district
court made the following remarks:  “I think the Court will need to have the issue, if the State
wishes, briefed further on whether the Court should even consider this evidence, since there was
an agreement that I wouldn’t.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.149, Ls.21-24.)  It went on to say, “[A]lthough
I’m  essentially  done  with  my  decision,  my  sense  of  justice  tells  me  it  wouldn’t  be  fair  to  the
State to proceed without giving them a chance to address these concerns that I’ve raised,
because” it never had a chance to respond to those.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.150, Ls.12-17.)  Finally, it
said if the State wanted the court to simply make its decision at that point, it would, but “if the
State would like to present more, I think you have a right to, in fairness.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.150,
Ls.20-25.)  The State said it would “appreciate some more time.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.2-3.)
The district court then asked how much time the prosecution would need and whether it
wanted to respond with briefing, other evidence, or witnesses.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.14-20.)
It said, “I think in fairness you should be allowed to do that, because you weren’t given proper
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notice that this issue was going to be raised.  And, of course, I also want you to brief whether or
not I should even consider this procedurally.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.20-25 (emphasis added).)
The prosecution was given the time it requested—45 days to brief not only the issue of
whether there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, but also the issue of the whether the
district court should even consider it.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.153, Ls.1-13, p.156, L.14 – p.157, L.21.)
The prosecution filed no brief arguing that the issue was procedurally barred.  Instead, it called
several witnesses at the next evidentiary hearing to testify on the reasonable suspicion issue.
(1/12/17 Tr., pp.9-111.)  It also made legal arguments on the issue.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.114, L.10 –
p.119, L.12, p.123, L.10 – p.126, L.18.)  Its argument now that it suffered an injustice due to lack
of notice is disingenuous.
The State claims that the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Bias had previously raised
the legality of the stop in his petition “cannot be reconciled” with the district court’s order
appointing counsel in which it stated that Mr. Bias had failed to assert why the stop had been
illegal.  (App. Br., pp.7-9.)  This argument is a red herring; the district court’s conclusion does
not  need  to  be  reconciled  with  its  order  appointing  counsel.   The  relevant  time  period  here  is
after the video was discovered.  When it was, post-conviction counsel moved to amend the
pleading.  He said, “[A]fter watching that video, I can’t help but raise the issue of probable cause
for a stop in this case.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.135, L.24 – p.136, L.1.)  He went on to say, “I think
looking at the video raises a whole new set of issues whether the officer had probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to even pull the vehicle over . . . .”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.3-6.)  The
district court then asked if post-conviction counsel was “asserting a new basis for post-
conviction relief on failure to suppress the evidence for lack of reasonable suspicion to pull over
the vehicle.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.19-22.)  Counsel answered, “Well, I think we have to, based
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on what we saw today on this video, Your Honor.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.136, Ls.23-24.)  The
prosecution was then given ample notice and an opportunity to respond.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152,
Ls.13-25, p.156, L.14 – p.157, L.21.)  I.R.C.P. 15(b) clearly supports this procedure.  “A party
may move, at any time . . . to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise
an unpleaded issue.”  I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2).  Further, “[t]he purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to
be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements.” Dunlap v. State,
141 Idaho 50, 57 (2005) (quoting Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 500
(2000)); see also Clark, 110 Idaho at 326 (1986).
The State also argues that the district court’s finding that the prosecution objected when
the issue was first raised “forecloses any claim that the issue was litigated with the express or
implied consent of the state.”  (App. Br., p.6, n.2.)  This is not correct.  I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1) states
that when “a party objects that evidence is not within the issues raised in the pleadings, the court
may permit the pleadings to be amended.”  The rule also indicates that the court “should freely
permit  an  amendment  when  doing  so  will  aid  in  presenting  the  merits  and  the  objecting  party
fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that party’s action or defense on the
merits.  The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence.”
I.R.C.P. 15(b)(1).  That is exactly what occurred here.  When the prosecution introduced the
video, post-conviction counsel moved to amend the pleadings as discussed above. The district
court allowed post-conviction counsel to amend the pleading to conform to the evidence because
it would aid in presenting the merits of the case.  Also, when the prosecution objected, the
district court allowed the prosecution to argue the issue.  (9/19/16 Tr., p.142, L.18 – p.144, L.6.)
It also allowed time—in the interest of fairness—for the prosecution to meet the evidence with
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briefing on the issue, and it held a third evidentiary hearing, so the State could present witnesses
and further argument on the issue.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.13-25, p.156, L.14 – p.157, L.21.)
The district court, particularly in light of the fact that the prosecution introduced a video
that the defense had never seen, properly allowed post-conviction counsel to rely on the new
evidence to support its new argument.  When the prosecution objected to the issue at the second
evidentiary hearing, the district court said, “Well, let’s assume we’re all in this business because
we’re trying to get it right.  So help me get it right.”  (9/19/16 Tr., p.142, Ls.7-20.)  And, in
recounting the progression of this case, the district court said because these “newer issues had
just developed at the very end of our last hearing, without the State having had an opportunity to
really—I felt  like  the  State  was  a  little  bit  unintentionally  or  accidentally  ambushed,  because  I
don’t think the plaintiff was intending to raise that issue until he actually saw the video.”
(1/12/17 Tr., p.138, Ls.11-20.)  It went on to state, “I think everybody, including the State, is
entitled to their day in court.  And I feel like everyone’s had that now.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.138,
Ls.23-25.)
A complete review of the record—particularly the district court’s focus on fair treatment
for all the parties—shows that this was an accurate statement, and the prosecution was not
prejudiced.  Post-conviction counsel informed the district court, in the presence of the
prosecution, on September 19, 2016, that the video revealed an additional ineffective assistance
of counsel claim—for failing to challenge the reasonable suspicion for the stop.  That issue was
not argued until January 12, 2017.  The prosecution had ample notice and failed to file a brief or
make any further arguments on whether the district court should consider the issue.  Thus, it also
failed to satisfy the court that consideration of the new issue would prejudice its defense on the
merits.  As such, the district court did not err in considering the claim.
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D. The Issue Of Whether Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A Motion To
Suppress Challenging The Reasonable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop Was Tried With
The Implicit Consent Of The Prosecution
On January 12, 2017, having failed to file a brief on the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to challenge the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and whether the
district court should consider the issue, the prosecutor appeared at a hearing to determine
whether there was reasonable suspicion for the stop.   (1/12/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-23; R., pp.59-60.)
He came prepared with four witnesses and made his arguments on the issue.  (1/12/17
Tr., generally.)
Therefore,  this  issue  was  clearly  tried  with  the  implied  consent  of  the  prosecution.
“When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it
must be treated in all respects as if raised by the pleadings.”  I.R.C.P. 15(b)(2).  “The
requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties
assures that the parties have notice of the issues before the court and an opportunity to address
those issues with evidence and argument.” M. K. Transp., Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349
(1980).  Additionally, “when a theory is fully tried by the parties, I.R.C.P. 15(b) allows a court to
base its decision on a theory not pleaded ‘and deem the pleadings amended accordingly . . . .’”
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 57 (quoting Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 502 (1996)).
The district court allowed the prosecution to brief why it might have been prejudiced by
the court’s consideration of the issue, and the prosecution had ample opportunity to continue to
object  along  those  lines.   Instead  of  doing  that,  however,  it  called  more  witnesses  at  the  next
evidentiary hearing, and the parties litigated the issue thoroughly.  (See generally 1/12/17 Tr.)
Finally,  the district  court  identified this as an issue and ruled on it.   Thus,  even if  post-
conviction counsel never formally amended the pleading, the district court could deem the
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pleading amended. See Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 57-58.  Had the district court ruled on the issue
after the second evidentiary hearing without giving the state time to meet the evidence, this
would  require  a  different  analysis.   However,  that  was  not  the  case  here.   The  issue  was  tried
with the consent of the prosecution.
II.
The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards When It Held That Mr. Bias’s Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective
A. Introduction
The State asserts that the district court applied the wrong standard when it held that
Mr. Bias’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress challenging the
reasonable suspicion for Mr. Bias’s traffic stop.  The State’s argument fails because it ignores
relevant facts.  First, the district court applied the proper standard because it specifically
considered whether trial counsel’s failure to request discovery and file the motion could have
been a reasonable strategy.  Second, the district court found that Mr. Bias would not have pled
guilty if he had seen the video.  Thus, it properly applied two correct standards in finding that
Mr. Bias’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file the motion.
B. Standard Of Review
“This Court exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to
the facts.” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2005).
C. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct. App. 2015).
“To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Heilman, 158 Idaho at 145
(citations omitted). “Ultimately, ‘the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 717
(2017) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306 (1999)). Strategic and tactical decisions
made by trial counsel can be second-guessed only if “those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60 (citation omitted).
“To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” Heilman, 158 Idaho at 145 (citations omitted).  Where a claimant alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress, “a ‘critical inquiry is whether the
motion, if filed, should have been granted.’” Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717 (citations
omitted).  “[O]nce it has been determined the motion, had it been filed, should have been
granted, the petitioner is still required to overcome the presumption that the decision not to file
the  motion  ‘was  within  the  wide  range  of  permissible  discretion  and  trial strategy.’”
Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 718 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).  Prejudice can also be
established  if  the  claimant  shows  “that  there  is  a  reasonable  probability  that  but  for  counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted).
Here, the district court found that a motion to suppress would have been granted if it had
been filed.  (R., pp.64, 72.)  However, the State, relying on Wurdemann, claims that the district
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court erred because it did not conduct “the proper analysis of whether Bias had overcome the
presumption  that  the  decision  not  to  file  the  motion  was  within  the  wide  range  of  permissible
discretion  and  trial  strategy.”   (App.  Br.,  pp.13-17.)   The  State  fails  to  acknowledge  that  trial
counsel’s strategy was specifically addressed in this case, and thus Mr. Bias did overcome the
presumption that his trial counsel’s actions were within the wide range of permissible discretion
and  trial  strategy.   In  fact,  both  post-conviction  counsel  and  the  district  court  questioned  trial
counsel about his strategy at the third evidentiary hearing, and the district court—in its opinion—
explicitly considered whether trial counsel’s actions constituted a reasonable strategy.  (1/12/17
Tr., p.32, L.21 – p.38, L.22; R., pp.64, 71-72.)  For example, post-conviction counsel asked trial
counsel whether reviewing the video to see what happened in the stop could have given him
“ammunition to help weaken the State’s case,” to achieve his sentencing strategy, and trial
counsel agreed that it would have.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.34, L.25 – p.35, L.11.)
Similarly, trial counsel agreed with the district court that it would behoove him to review
a video of the traffic stop before allowing his client to plead guilty.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.7-11.)
Trial counsel also agreed—when specifically questioned about his strategy—that he could have
used constitutional problems with the stop in negotiating “to get a lower charge made or
considerations in sentencing recommendation.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.37, L.11 – p.38, L.6.)  He further
agreed that, if he had seen the video, it “could have played a role in the ultimate sentence” that
he negotiated with the State.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.38, Ls.7-22.)  Also, when the prosecutor cited
Strickland and argued that trial counsel’s strategy of focusing on sentencing was reasonable
because his client told him he made a mistake and wanted help, the district court said that, while
it did not “want to get into the business of second-guessing defense counsel’s strategy,” it was
trial counsel, not Mr. Bias, who had the legal training.  (1/12/17 Tr., p.116, L.21 – p.119, L.24.)
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The district court went on to further discuss whether trial counsel’s strategy was
reasonable.  It asked how an attorney could make a decision on what to do “without seeing the
video or inquiring further, to know whether or not there’s even a basis to challenge any of the
issues . . . .”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.119, L.24 – p.120, L.3.)  Finally, the district court said, “In other
words, to say, ‘Well, Mr. Bias told me he didn’t think there was any problem,’ that means the
attorney  with  the  law  degree  is  relying  upon  the  defendant  without  the  law  degree  to  make  a
legal conclusion.  And I’m not sure Strickland necessarily quite supports that kind of way of
practicing law.”  (1/12/17 Tr., p.120, Ls.3-9.)
In its discussion of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request discovery,
the  district  court  wrote,  “The  Court  is  concerned  about  the  precedent  that  would  be  set  by  too
broadly permitting an attorney with a law degree to completely rely upon his client’s lay analysis
of his best legal strategy, without the benefit of complete discovery.”  (R., p.69.)  It went on to
state, “In order to make a knowing and intelligent decision to plead guilty, the defendant should
at least know whether the evidence is sufficient to obtain a conviction.  Even if the defendant
intends to plead guilty, discovery could allow him greater leverage in negotiating a plea
agreement.”  (R., p.69.)
Perhaps most importantly, the district court wrote—in addressing whether the first prong
of Strickland had been met—that despite “the weakness in the evidence supporting reasonable
suspicion for a stop as contained in the police report, Bias pled guilty anyway.”  (R., p.71.)  It
also wrote,  “[t]he failure to challenge the stop on the basis of the tenuous grounds alleged in the
police reports alone fell short of the objective standard of reasonableness set forth by Strickland,
and was a primary reason why the dashcam video was not discovered sooner.  Therefore, the first
Strickland prong has been met.”  (R., p.71.)  And it immediately conducted the analysis that the
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State argues is missing here.  It stated, “By so holding, the Court does not wish to second-guess a
strategic decision made by an experienced defense attorney.  However, this case clearly
illustrates the pitfalls of having a defendant plead guilty without conducting thorough
investigation and discovery.”  (R., p.72 (internal  citation omitted).)  Therefore, the court clearly
held that trial counsel’s representation was not within the trial counsel’s permissible discretion
and trial  strategy.   This  comment,  and  the  district  court’s  various  other  comments  on  strategy,
show that district court found that trial counsel’s decisions were actually based on inadequate
preparation or other shortcomings that the court could objectively evaluate—namely the failure
to request discovery—and thus it could legitimately second-guess trial counsel’s decisions tied to
that failure, regardless of whether they are labeled “strategic.”
The State also fails to acknowledge that the district court applied a second standard to
hold that trial counsel’s actions prejudiced Mr. Bias:  “The Court must further conclude that but
for counsel’s failure to request discovery and challenge the constitutionality of the stop, Bias
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.  Therefore, Bias has shown
that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s actions, and the second prong of Strickland is also met.”
(R., p.72 (internal citation omitted).)  Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, the district court
relied on two proper standards to find that that the prejudice prong of Strickland was met.  And it
specifically considered whether trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.
The State claims that “[t]his case is not meaningfully distinguishable from [State v.
Mathews, 133 Idaho 300 (1999)].”  (App. Br., p.15.)  But, as the Court there specifically found
that trial counsel had extensively investigated his client’s case, it is highly distinguishable.  In
Mathews, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was substantial and competent evidence to
support the district court’s finding that trial counsel “reasonably concluded, upon discovering the
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discrepancy in the date on the warrant, that the error was merely a clerical oversight by the
magistrate not affecting the validity of the finding of probable cause.”  133 Idaho at 308
(emphasis added).  Thus, it appeared that trial counsel properly investigated.  As such, the Court,
“applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” also held that trial counsel’s
“failure to conduct additional investigation regarding the signing of the warrant and his failure to
file a motion to suppress on that ground was reasonable given the extent of his previous
investigation of the issuance and execution of the warrants, his previous contact with the issuing
magistrate, and his determination that probable cause existed to support the warrants.” Id.
(emphasis added).  Here, in stark contrast, trial counsel failed to request discovery, so he had no
knowledge that an exculpatory video existed that proved there was no reasonable suspicion for
the stop.
Further, the district court found that “the descriptions in the police report raise the same
concerns as the video to a sufficient degree that defense counsel should have challenged the stop
or at least investigated further.”  (R., p.64.)  Similarly, the district court found that “the tenuous
justification provided for the stop in the police reports at least required further inquiry and
investigation—which the Court concludes would likely have led to the discovery of the dashcam
video.”  (R., p.69.)  The district court also stated, “The failure to challenge the stop on the basis
of the tenuous grounds alleged in the police reports alone fell short of the objective standard of
reasonableness set forth by Strickland, and was a primary reason why the dashcam video was not
discovered sooner.”  (R., p.71.)  These findings specifically disprove the State’s claim that there
was “neither evidence, nor any finding, based on counsel’s experience with cases with similar
facts and the state of the law in 2012, counsel’s decision to pursue the suppression motion issue
no further was unreasonable.”  (App.  Br., p.15 (emphasis added).)  They also disprove the
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State’s  claim  that  the  district  court  “did  not  find  whether  the  decision  to  not  file  was  even  a
‘close question’ based on police reports . . . .”  (App. Br., p.16.)  The district court clearly found
that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a suppression motion based on the police reports
alone.
Nevertheless,  the  State  also  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  by  relying  on  repeated
viewings of the dashcam video, which trial counsel did not rely on.  (App. Br., p.16.)  However,
the district court said it was “mindful that defense counsel did not have access to the dashcam
video prior to trial—just the police report.”  (R., p.64.)  But, this is when the district court stated
that the “descriptions in the police report raise the same concerns as the video to a sufficient
degree that defense counsel should have challenged the stop or investigated further.”  (R., p.64.)
And the State’s argument again ignores the fact that trial counsel failed to request discovery.
The State argues that the district court “specifically found that Bias had not raised a claim
counsel was ineffective for not obtaining the video prior to deciding not to pursue suppression.”
(App. Br., p.16.)  Such an argument, however, ties back to the basic premise here; it is
impossible to raise an issue concerning something that you do not know exists.  And the State is
relying on technicalities of pleading instead of acknowledging that the district court properly
decided the merits of the new issue and gave Mr. Bias his day in court.  The only reason trial
counsel did not see the video is he did not request discovery; he should have been the one
repeatedly viewing the video on his client’s behalf.
    Finally,  the  State  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  in  relying  on State v. Neal, 159
Idaho 439 (2015), because it was decided after trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the stop.
(App. Br., p.17.)  But the district court’s opinion clearly shows that its decision was not “wholly
dependent on Neal,” even acknowledging that trial counsel’s “performance cannot be found to
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have been deficient based on a case that was not decided yet.”  (R., p.61, n.23.)  Instead, it relied
on earlier cases—relied on in Neal and decided well before trial counsel’s decision in this case—
for the proposition that merely touching the fog line does not provide reasonable suspicion for a
stop.  (R., pp.61-62 (discussing State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991), and State v.
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209 (Ct. App. 1998).)  The district court also noted the many out of
state cases, decided before 2012, holding that touching the fog line did not establish reasonable
suspicion.  (R., p.61, n.23.)  In fact, when it discussed Neal, it said that were “indications in that
case that perhaps that may have been the rule earlier.”  (11/28/16 Tr., p.151, Ls.21-24.)  It also
explained that the statute was clear that crossing the line was an infraction but touching it was
not.  (11/28/16 Tr., p.152, Ls.2-4.)
Furthermore, the district court properly applied a totality analysis to reach its holding that
there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop and found that “[n]one of the factors cited by the
officer, taken individually, would constitute an infraction of Idaho law or a violation of the rules
of the road.  More importantly, even taken together, the clues identified did not give rise to
reasonable suspicion of DUI.”  (R., p.63.)  It went on to state, “The Court concludes that during
an approximately 60-second span of time, driving 55 mph in a 65 mph zone at night, lightly
tapping the brakes, and briefly touching—but not crossing—the white fog line, do not provide
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop on suspicion of DUI . . . .”  (R., p.63.)  Thus, the district




Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order granting his
petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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